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1 Introduction 
 
Once upon a time… Yes, once upon a time, Dutch voters were predictable. With only three 
questions on social class, religious preference, and frequency of attendance at religious 
services, in the mid-1950s one could correctly predict the vote choice of over 70 per cent of 
voters at national elections (Lijphart, 1974). Because these characteristics generally did not 
change between elections and voters knew their position with respect to the political 
parties, most voters also knew far before an election for which party they would vote. 
 Once upon a time is not now. The system of verzuiling or pillarization broke down in 
the second half of the 20th century and no longer provides a guide to electoral behavior of 
Dutch  citizens (e.g., Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 1989b). They no longer know far in advance for 
which party to vote and electoral volatility is high (e.g., Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2008a; Mair, 
2008). In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) of 1971, 70 per cent of Dutch 
voters reported that they knew months in advance for which party they would vote and only 
10 per cent said they waited until a few days before the election to determine their choice 
(Todosijevic et al., 2010: 73). According to the DPES 2017, in the general elections of March 
15, 2017 only about 30 per cent of voters knew well in advance for which party they would 
vote, while 40 per cent waited until the last days of the campaign or even voting day itself to 
make a final choice (Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 2018: 31). They decided at the last minute, as 
nowadays so many voters in various countries do (e.g., McAllister, 2002). 
 In studies of elections, these late deciders receive a substantial amount of attention 
and are often treated as ‘special’ voters. It is frequently suggested that their vote is crucial: 
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“late-deciding voters are regarded by political actors - especially parties and candidates - as 
the group that determines the outcome of the election” (He, 2016: 362; see also He, 2017: 
119). Or: “Late deciders have (…) become quite numerous at recent elections. As a 
consequence their choices increasingly determine election results” (Schmitt-Beck & 
Partheymuller, 2012: 299). Strictly speaking this is a myth or misunderstanding; the votes of 
late deciders have no more impact on the outcome than those of early deciders. All votes 
count equally. The basis for the myth is arguably the reliance that politicians, the media, and 
the voters place on public opinion polls. Throughout the election campaign, results of such 
polls are presented. And though the media sometimes make a half-hearted attempt to 
explain that the polls present merely a snapshot of the current situation and not a prediction 
of the outcome, many observers are led to derive expectations of the outcome. So if the late 
deciders divide their votes differently than the early deciders, surprises can ensue and it 
appears that these late deciders have ‘determined’ the outcome.  
 Complicating this is that it is argued or simply stated that the behavior of late 
deciders is difficult to understand, let alone predict. “The brain of the floating voter is 
inscrutable”, according to a Dutch national newspaper (de Volkskrant, 6 March 2017). 
Political scientists have also taken a dim view and bemoaned their inability to explain the 
behavior of such late deciding voters. Sixty years ago The American Voter referred to “the 
near-random behavior of those deciding late in the campaign” (Campbell et al., 1960: 79-
80). Many days have gone by, but the electoral calculus of the late deciders still allows such a 
‘pessimistic’ view: “a last-minute decision is often a ‘snap’ decision by a voter who cares 
little and knows less” (Chaffee & Rimal, 1996: 269). 
 The quote from Campbell and colleagues indicates that late deciders were identified 
and have received scholarly attention long before the numbers of such voters began to 
increase. Even earlier, in their classic study Voting, Berelson and associates suggested that 
delaying one’s decision should be attributed to what they coined as ‘cross-pressures’; 
“opinions or views simultaneously supporting different sides” made voters “unstable in 
their voting position during the campaign” (Berelson et al., 1954: 19). Since these seminal 
studies, the study of late deciders has remained on the agenda, only increasing in attention 
as the numbers of such voters has risen in advanced Western democracies (see, for example, 
Catellani & Alberici, 2012; Dalton et al., 2000; He, 2016; 2017; Kosmidis & Xezonakis, 2010; 
McAllister, 2002; Nir & Druckman, 2007; Schmitt-Beck & Partheymuller, 2012).  
 There are two distinct research questions in the literature concerning the timing of 
the vote decision. One follows the tradition of Berelson and asks what factors are important 
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in explaining or determining the timing of the vote choice (see, for example, Henderson & 
Hillygus, 2016; Kenski, 2007; Lavine, 2001; McGregor, 2012; Orriols & Martinez, 2014). On 
the other hand and from the earliest empirical studies of voting onwards, e.g., The American 
Voter, scholars have commented on the characteristics of late deciders - these comments 
were generally rather negative - and tried to sketch the late decider profile. This resulted in 
a considerable literature focusing on various ‘typical’ characteristics of late deciders (see, for 
example, Catellani & Alberici, 2012; Chaffee & Choe, 1980; Fournier et al., 2004; Gopolan & 
Hadjiharalambous, 1994; Kosmidis & Xezonakis, 2010). Each research question has its 
merits, but in particular because of the negative, pessimistic comments concerning late 
deciders, the decision has been made here to focus upon the characteristics of those who 
postpone their decision until the last moments before the election. Is the pessimistic view on 
these citizens empirically correct or is their rehabilitation warranted? 
We ask the following questions. Do late deciders differ from early deciders in terms 
of their sociodemographic profile? Are they less informed? Do they have different attitudes 
and opinions; are they perhaps cross-pressured by conflicting opinions? How similar or 
dissimilar is their voting behavior and do they in any sense determine the election results? 
Or do they have to make their choice from a larger set of possibilities than those who know 
far in advance which party they favor? The answers to these questions will be based on the 
Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2017 (weighted data); our findings show a profile of the 
Dutch late decider. This is a descriptive endeavor. But “[c]ontrary to what some political 
scientists believe, description is a worthy scientific goal in its own right” (Toshkov, 2018: 
223) and “[p]rogress in the discipline of political science rests not simply on the 
development of new techniques of research design and analysis intended to solve 
recalcitrant problems of identification in causal inference. Equally important is the 
seemingly prosaic act of description. As it stands, we simply do not know with any degree of 
precision or confidence what is going on out there” (Gerring, 2012: 743). 
 
2 Profiling late deciders 
 
2.1 Demographics 
We are relieved from the task of providing our own literature review concerning the 
characteristics of late deciders, since this has recently been done by Orriols and Martinez 
(see also Willocq, 2018): 
The literature gives a fairly consistent profile of the main socio-economic and political traits 
of the undecided voters. Existing research usually characterizes them as individuals with 
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lower levels of education, weaker political preferences and lesser interest in politics. 
Indecision is also associated with demographics: women and younger voters are more likely 
to reach the late stages of a campaign with a decision about whom to vote for (…). Among all 
the above factors, the standard conclusion is that weaker political preferences, and in 
particular party identification, are the most correlated with being undecided.” (Orriols & 
Martinez, 2014: 13) 
 
Although gender and age as such tell us little about electoral behavior, these variables 
invariably turn up in the political science literature in general and are also included in 
research on late deciders. So for starters, Table 1a provides a profile of the late decider on 
these two characteristics (for voters in the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election). 
In his review of the literature on the determinants of late deciding, Willocq also 
mentions gender and age as sociodemographic characteristics that “have been argued to 
influence time of vote decision”(Willocq, 2018: 2). Concerning gender he cites contradictory 
findings, however, with five studies finding that “women are more prone than men to delay 
their vote decision until the campaign is under way” and three studies in which no 
statistically significant impact was found (Willocq, 2018: 2). Our results support those who 
find a gender difference: women are underrepresented among those who decide in the last 
weeks or earlier before election day and overrepresented among those who decided in the 
last days or on election day. This finding concurs with a study specifically focusing on the 
impact of gender; Kenski (2007: 20) reported that “women were more likely to say that they 
did not know for whom they intended to vote when asked their voting intentions.” 
 
Table 1a. Timing of the vote and gender and age for the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election 
Time of vote 
decision  
On 
Election 
day 
In the last  
days before 
election 
In the last 
weeks before 
the election 
A couple of 
months before 
the election 
More than a couple 
of months before 
the election 
Gender 
Men 38 44 54 61 56 
Women 62 56 46 39 44 
Total  
N= 
100% 
335 
100% 
651 
100% 
525 
100% 
219 
100% 
700 
Age (groups) 
18-39 41 48 43 34 19 
40-65 44 40 40 46 47 
66 plus 16 12 17 20 34 
Total 
N= 
101% 
325 
100% 
651 
100% 
526 
100% 
219 
100% 
700 
 
 With regard to age, Willocq concludes that all previous studies demonstrate “that 
young citizens are more likely than their elders to make their voting choice late in the 
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campaign” (2018: 2). Our results are no exception to this rule.1 Among those who make up 
their minds long before the election, only 19 per cent were young voters, i.e. younger than 
40 years of age. Among those who make up their minds in the last weeks, days or on election 
day, the percentages are twice as high.  
 The quote above also indicated that ‘lower levels of education’ are characteristic of 
late deciders. Our data show differently, or at least the relationship is weak (see Table 1b). 
Although because of the large sample size, Chi Square is statistically significant, but ordinal 
measures of association are very low (e.g., Gamma= -.042). In this respect Dutch voters 
differ from voters in other countries.  
 
Table 1b. Timing of the vote and level of education for the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election 
Time of vote 
decision  
On 
Election 
day 
In the last  
days before 
election 
In the last 
weeks before 
the election 
A couple of 
months before 
the election 
More than a couple 
of months before 
the election 
Level of education 
Lower 11 7 7 9 15 
Middle 46 50 45 46 44 
Higher 43 43 48 46 41 
Total 
N= 
100% 
301 
100% 
568 
100% 
461 
101% 
206 
100% 
632 
 
2.2 Party Attachment 
Attachment to party or party identification generally emerges as the most important factor 
leading to late decisions. Those who are strongly attached to a party will know far in 
advance that at any election they will support this party, whereas those without such an 
attachment will be less certain of their choice and may wait until late to reach a decision. 
The concept of party identification is associated with the Michigan School (e.g., Campbell et 
al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960) and implies a long-standing attachment to a party that 
remains stable throughout one’s lifetime, even though one might deviate from one’s 
attachment and occasionally cast a vote for another party. The attempt to import this 
concept into the Netherlands has been problematic, however: when one changed one’s 
voting behavior, the attachment was changed and in the Netherlands identification causally 
followed party choice and not vice versa (Thomassen, 1976; Thomassen & Rosema, 2009).  
Nevertheless, several questions have remained in the Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Studies that are used to measure ‘party attachment’. These questions were used to 
differentiate Adherents, Leaners and Non-Adherents and Table 2 shows that, whatever the 
conceptual problems may be, the general conclusion in the literature empirically holds for 
                                                          
1 To make presentation manageable, age has been grouped into three categories: 18-39; 40-65; 66 
and older. 
6 
 
the Dutch case. The results support the conclusion that “[p]arty identification is 
unanimously considered as one of the most reliable predictors of timing of the voting 
choice”(Willocq, 2018: 2). Among those who made their decision more than a couple of 
months before the election, 38 per cent indicated that they were Adherents of a party and 
only 14 per cent said they were Non-Adherents. The results for those who decided on 
election day were different, with 6 per cent claiming any party adherence, as opposed to 
about 50 per cent who were Non-Adherents.  
 
Table 2. Timing of the vote and party attachment for the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election 
Time of vote 
decision  
On 
Election 
day 
In the last  
days before 
election 
In the last 
weeks before 
the election 
A couple of 
months before 
the election 
More than a 
couple of months 
before the election 
Party attachment 
Adherents 6 10 20 27 38 
Leaners 43 54 59 49 48 
Non-Adherents 51 36 21 24 14 
Total 
N= 
100% 
193 
100% 
326 
100% 
257 
100% 
101 
100% 
423 
 
2.3 Interest in politics and the election campaign 
The nature of the impact of political interest (or political sophistication, involvement in 
politics, or however it is called) on the timing of the vote decision has been contested. The 
earliest studies, e.g., The People’s Choice (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) and The American Voter 
offered the pessimistic view that late deciders were uninterested and uninformed. However, 
recent studies have taken a more optimistic view that late deciders were often politically 
sophisticated, with high levels of political involvement (see Willocq, 2018, for a summary of 
the argument; see also e.g., McAllister, 2002). 
 Overall, our results tend to support the optimistic view, although this is not exactly 
what our first indicator suggests (see Table 3a). Among those who made a decision on 
election day, 19 per cent reported to have little political interest, as opposed to between 9 
and 13 per cent for all other groups. Those who made their decision during the last days or 
on election day had ‘very interested’ percentages of 11 and 13, as opposed to slightly over 
20 per cent for earlier deciders. Some difference, but not really enough to claim that late 
deciders were uninterested.  
Turning from a general expression of political interest to a more specific effort to 
obtain information, respondents were asked how frequently they read news in the 
newspapers. Again, a relationship with timing of the vote is found, but again it is weak. A 
majority of all groups report reading a newspaper at least once a week. However, this may 
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not be an accurate or valid indication of attention to news, since newspaper reading is more 
prevalent among older voters, as in particular younger voters turn to other sources of 
information (e.g., Wennekers et al., 2018). Moreover, the question does not focus on 
information about the election, and, indeed, when asked how often they read about the 
election campaign in the newspapers, the difference between the groups becomes very 
small. Among the earliest deciders, 58 per cent report reading ‘almost always’ or ‘often’ 
about election news, as compared to 52 per cent of those who only decided on election day.  
 
Table 3a. Timing of the vote and political/campaign interest for 2017 Dutch parliamentary election 
Time of vote decision  Election 
day 
Last 
 days 
Last 
weeks 
Months 
before 
More than 
months before 
Subjectieve political interest    
- very interested 
- somewhat interested 
- not interested 
11 
70 
19 
13 
76 
11 
24 
66 
9 
22 
64 
13 
23 
65 
12 
Read newspaper      
- almost daily 
- few times a week 
- few times a month 
- seldom or never 
38 
18 
12 
33 
40 
21 
13 
26 
44 
22 
9 
26 
54 
21 
8 
17 
57 
15 
6 
22 
Read in newspapers about election campaign   
- almost always 
- often 
- now and then 
- seldom or never 
15 
37 
36 
12 
20 
35 
40 
7 
21 
36 
37 
6 
16 
42 
38 
4 
24 
34 
34 
8 
Watch NOS Journal/RTL news   
- (almost) daily 
- 3 or 4 times a week 
- 1 or 2 times a week 
- less than once a week 
49/34 
16/12 
15/15 
20/39 
44/27 
19/12 
15/18 
22/44 
58/28 
15/14 
14/15 
14/44 
59/19 
18/16 
13/11 
11/54 
67/27 
11/15 
13/17 
9/42 
Watch debates with party leaders    
- one or more fully 
- fragments debates 
- did not see debates  
32 
45 
23 
34 
48 
19 
37 
48 
15 
31 
52 
17 
34 
46 
20 
Follow election campaign   
- (very) intensively 
- not so intensively 
- did not follow at all 
38 
52 
10 
47 
49 
4 
54 
43 
3 
48 
51 
2 
48 
47 
5 
Note: The above numbers represent percentages (weighted data) that in most cases are based upon 
approximately 335 respondents who decided on election day, 650 respondents who decided in the 
last days before the election, 525 who decided in the last weeks, 220 who made their decision in the 
months before election day, and 700 who knew longer in advance for which party they would vote. 
 
 Although the times - and news consumption - may be ‘a-changin’, television remains 
an important source of news for many voters (e.g., Van Praag, 2014; see also De Vreese, 
2008). The 8 p.m. NOS news broadcast is still watched by large numbers of voters; on 
average about 2 million people or one third of all people watching television at that time, are 
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watching this news broadcast.2  Among late deciders, no fewer than 67 per cent report 
watching daily, dropping to less than 50 per cent among those deciding in the last days and 
on election day. The percentages for the 7.30 p.m. news on the commercial station RTL are 
lower in all groups, but vary interestingly in a different fashion. Whereas 27 per cent of the 
early deciders report watching RTL-news daily, this percentage is actually higher (!) among 
those deciding on election day (34%). Yet, once again, when the question is not stated in 
general terms, but focusses on news related to the campaign, the results are modified. 
Respondents were asked if they had watched any of the election debates between the party 
leaders that were televised. Virtually no difference is found among the groups. Across the 
groups, approximately one-third of the respondents reporting having watched one or more 
of the four major debates, and about one-fifth reported not having viewed any of the 
debates. 
 Summing up, respondents were asked how intensively they had followed the 2017 
election campaign. The results show considerable interest in and attention to the campaign. 
Although among those who decided on election day itself, 38 per cent reported that they had 
followed the campaign ‘(very) intensively’, for other groups about half fell into these 
categories. Only very small percentages, varying from 10 per cent for the election day 
deciders to 5 or fewer per cent for other groups, indicated that they had not followed the 
campaign at all. 
 These results so far indicate that it is not correct and almost insulting to call late 
deciders uninterested and inattentive. Dutch voters across the board are using the 
traditional media to obtain information on parties and party plans during the election 
campaign. Yet, this is not the only information voters may be seeking. Irwin and Van 
Holsteyn (2008b; see also Geers et al., 2018) have shown that Dutch voters are also 
interested in the choices of their fellow voters. They try to vote strategically. For them, 
voting in proportional systems with coalition governments is a two-stage process and they 
look beyond the election results to attempt to influence the formation of the new 
government. In this respect, election polls taken during the campaign are an essential source 
of information concerning how other voters will vote and how the election outcome may be. 
In the DPES 2017, respondents were asked how often they encountered the results of 
opinion polls3 and the ubiquity of polls in the Netherlands is revealed by their answers (see 
Table 3b). Only between 11 and 17 per cent of the groups indicated that they had never 
come across poll results. Equal percentages (12%) of the election day deciders and earliest 
                                                          
2 See https://nos.nl/artikel/2078779-het-nos-journaal-is-jarig-hoe-werd-het-bekeken-in-2015.html 
3 No indication was given of possible sources. 
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deciders reported that they frequently saw poll results; those who decided in the last weeks 
or months were slightly higher at 19 and 16 per cent. In general, there is only the very 
weakest of relationships between the time of the vote decision and attention to the polls.  
These results do nothing to negate the finding that probably many and at least some of those 
voters waiting until the last minute are interested in the relative success of parties so that 
the can consider and cast a strategic vote.  
 
Table 3b. Timing of the vote and attention to opinion polls, 2017 
Time of vote 
decision  
On 
Election 
day 
In the last  
days before 
election 
In the last 
weeks before 
the election 
A couple of 
months before 
the election 
More than a couple 
of months before 
the election 
Come across opinion poll results 
- almost never 17 14 11 11 15 
- sometimes 34 34 24 33 31 
- multiple times 37 39 46 41 42 
- very often 12 13 19 16 12 
Total 
N= 
100% 
190 
100% 
333 
100% 
263 
101% 
103 
100% 
430 
 
3 Cross Pressures and Ambivalence 
 
An interesting concept to emerge from The People’s Choice was the idea of ‘cross pressures’, 
originally associated with the pressures from being part of various demographic groups.  To 
this socio-demographic cross-pressuring, the authors of The American Voter added the idea 
of attitude inconsistency or cross-pressures. Those who had a high level of ‘attitude conflict’ 
were more likely to decide late in the campaign (Campbell et al., 1960: 81-83).  
 Related to the idea of cross-pressures is the concept of ambivalence, i.e., “[t]he 
variability in the considerations associated with an attitude object” (Lavine, 2001: 916). 
Ambivalence can be determined by examining the “positive and negative evaluations of the 
candidates’ character and issue preferences” (Lavine, 2001:  918) and along with 
partisanship and political interest, ‘polarized character assessments’ were associated with 
early choices, whereas the opposites, lack of partisanship, lack of interest, and ‘moderate 
assessments of candidate character’ were associated with late decisions (Lavine, 2001: 921).
 The studies mentioned are carried out in the American context and it is not always 
clear how these results should be applied in a multi-party proportional system as in the 
Netherlands. In her attempt to extend the study of issue cross-pressures and time of voting 
decision to systems other than the US, He concluded that issue cross-pressures had the 
largest impact in the Netherlands, followed by the United Kingdom, and was the weakest in 
Germany (He, 2016: 362; see also He, 2017: 133). However, her operationalization of issue-
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cross pressures is complicated and, more importantly, she does not take the dimensionality 
of the Dutch party system into account. 
 As said, there once was a time that a majority of Dutch voters made their decision 
before any election campaign was started. They belonged to a specific socio-demographic 
section of society or ‘pillar’, that remained stable from election to election; five parties 
dominated the vote and voters stayed with their party. This has been referred to as the 
‘structured model’ of voting (see e.g., Andeweg & Irwin, 2014: 117-119). However, as voting 
along these structured lines diminished, other explanatory models had to be developed and 
the concept of an ideological issue dimension model was introduced (e.g., Irwin et al., 1987; 
Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 1989b). This model was based on two dimensions dividing the parties 
and the electorate: a socio-economic and a religious-secular dimension. To represent these 
dimensions, the question of reduction of income differences represented the socio-economic 
dimension and abortion and later euthanasia represented the religious-secular dimension. 
Using seven-point polar items from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies, a two-
dimensional matrix of 49 cells was created. Within this matrix, three ‘heartlands’ for the 
three major parties were defined. Those who wished to reduce income differences and were 
in favor of allowing the patient to decide for euthanasia composed the heartland for the 
Labor (PvdA) party. Those who favored allowing euthanasia and favored increasing income 
differences, fell in the Liberal (VVD) heartland. Those who would forbid euthanasia were 
placed in the Christian Democratic (CDA) heartland; the Christian Democratic parties had 
always welcomed religious voters, whatever their position on social-economic questions. 
    Viewing the political landscape from this ideological perspective shows that it would 
have been difficult to identify cross-pressured voting. Whereas in the American context, a 
voter might hold positions that were not congruent with the two major parties, in the 
Netherlands there was much less cross-pressuring because there was always a party to 
represent the particular combination of positions. Strong cross-pressures or ambivalence 
was excluded: there was a party to fit any combination of positions. 
What was left over, however, were combinations of positions for voters who did not 
have clear issue positions on one or both of the dimensions. This was labelled the 
Battlefield; it was among such voters that the most votes could be won for major parties. 
Following this line of reasoning, it is not cross-pressuring that should lead to late decisions 
in the Dutch multi-party proportional system, but the lack of any pressure in some direction. 
Analogous to the cross-pressured or ambivalent American voters, these inconclusive voters 
could be expected to delay their decisions later than those who fit into one of the heartlands.  
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Consequently we expect to find a higher proportion of battlefield voters among late 
deciders. And indeed this relationship does exist, but is weaker than might be expected (see 
Table 4). The percentage of battlefield voters increases only from 39 per cent to 50 per cent 
as the election day approaches.  
 
Table 4. Timing of the vote and the heartland model, 2017 
Time of vote 
decision  
On 
Election 
day 
In the last  
days before 
election 
In the last 
weeks before 
the election 
A couple of 
months before 
the election 
More than a couple 
of months before 
the election 
Heartlands 
Labor  34 30 31 36 28 
Liberal  12 18 21 12 20 
Christ. Dem. 4 5 6 9 13 
Battlefield 50 47 43 44 39 
Total 
N= 
100% 
157 
100% 
274 
101% 
218 
101% 
87 
100% 
432 
 
 However, times are still ‘a-changin’ and the traditional heartland model no longer 
suffices to explain Dutch voting. The religious dimension has diminished in importance and 
a new dimension has emerged, i.e., an ‘authoritarian-libertarian’, ‘integration-demarcation’ 
or simply a ‘cultural’ dimension (see for an overview and discussion Andeweg & Irwin, 
2014: 124). This dimension proved to be relevant in 2002 with the arrival of Pim Fortuyn on 
the political stage and his electorally successful List Pim Fortuyn (e.g., Pellikaan et al., 2003; 
2007). After his assassination, the torch was passed to Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party 
(PVV). This new ‘cultural’ dimension opens up the possibility that cross-pressuring may 
recently have become a part of the electoral calculus for Dutch voters. 
To examine this, as in the original heartland model, a variable has been chosen that is 
key to the new dimension, related to questions regarding immigration, the integration of 
immigrants, and the multicultural society. To represent the ‘cultural’ dimension a seven-
position scale running from allowing immigrants to retain their own culture to requiring 
them to adapt and assimilate has been used. By combining this question with that involving 
income differences, again a 7x7 matrix has been created; this matrix is presented in Table 5a 
and provides the percentages of the joint frequency distribution on these two variables.4 
To determine whether voters might experience cross-pressuring it is relevant to 
know where the parties should be placed in the two-dimensional space. The DPES 
respondents were asked to place eight of the most important parties5 on these two scales. 
The mean value of these placements is reported in Table 5a between the respective values 
                                                          
4 All percentages of 0.5 or less have been rounded to zero. 
5 At the March 2017 general elections, these eight parties did get over 86 per cent of the total vote 
and gained 133 out of 150 seats in the Second Chamber of Parliament. 
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on the scale. The party placements reveal that no party provides the combination of favoring 
increased income differences and allowing immigrants to maintain their own identity. These 
voters would favor a conservative party on the question of income differences and a 
progressive party on allowing immigrants to maintain their own culture and are potentially 
subject to cross-pressuring.6 The percentage of those subject to such cross-pressuring is 
small, however, certainly compared to those citizens who favor lowering income differences 
but feel that immigrants should assimilate. No party espouses this combination of positions 
(see also e.g., Andeweg, 2018; Van der Brug et al., 2011). What stands out is the almost 
unanimous opinion that the PVV is the strongest in arguing that immigrants must assimilate 
(6.7 mean placement on a 7 point scale!). However, on the issue of income differences, the 
PVV is, on average, placed just to the left side of the scale with a handful of parties to its left. 
So at the lower left hand portion of the matrix are six cells which may be subject to cross-
pressuring: voters can support the PVV for because of its stand on immigrants, or choose a 
party of the left on the issue of income differences.7  
 
Table 5a. Frequency distribution of positions on income differences and cultural assimilation, 2017  
   Income differences smaller Income differences larger 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   
SP 1.9 
GL 2.3 
PvdA 2.5 
CU 3.3 
D66 3.6 
PVV 3.6 
CDA 3.8 
 VVD 5.2   
Maintain 
own 
culture 
 
 
1  2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
2  2 2 2 1 1 0 0 
3 GL 3.4 
PvdA 3.5 
D66 3.9 
SP 3.9 
1 2 3 3 1 0 0 
 4 CU 4.5 
CDA 4.6 
VVD 4.8 
4 3 4 6 3 0 0 
 
Fully 
assimilate 
5  3 2 4 6 3 1 0 
6 PVV 6.7 3 2 2 4 3 2 0 
7  8 2 2 3 2 1 1 
 
A variable has been created that includes both groups of potentially cross-pressured 
voters, labeling those in the upper right hand portion of the table as ‘right cross-pressured’ 
(4%) and those in the lower left hand cells as ‘left cross-pressured’ (20%); 76 per cent are 
presumably not suffering from strong cross-pressuring from this perspective. The question 
is whether these cross-pressured groups are overrepresented among the late deciders. This 
is not the case; ideologically cross-pressured voters are not overrepresented among the late-
                                                          
6 Cells that likely contain cross-pressuring are shaded. 
7 Cells that likely contain cross-pressuring are shaded. 
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deciders (see Table 5b). If anything, they are slightly overrepresented among those who 
knew the longest in advance for whom they would vote (25%, compared to about 20% for 
the left cross-pressured voters). 
 
Table 5b. Timing of the vote and ideological cross pressures, 2017 
Time of vote 
decision  
On 
Election 
day 
In the last  
days before 
election 
In the last 
weeks before 
the election 
A couple of 
months before 
the election 
More than a couple 
of months before 
the election 
Cross-pressured 
Left  21 14 16 18 25 
Right 3 5 3 4 4 
Not  76 81 82 78 70 
Total 
N= 
100% 
296 
100% 
591 
101% 
497 
100% 
205 
99% 
639 
 
An explanation can be found by looking at the choices made by these left cross-
pressured voters. More than one-fourth chose the PVV and almost one-fifth chose the 
Socialist Party (SP).8 In general, PVV voters were among those who had determined their 
vote long in advance. To the extent that they ever felt cross-pressured, they resolved this 
dilemma well in advance by placing the emphasis on the cultural dimension. For those who 
placed their emphasis on the socio-economic dimension, they chose the party that was the 
strongest on this dimension. Apparently it took them no longer to make this determination 
than others who postponed their decision until the last minute. 
   In conclusion, cross-pressuring or ambivalence does not seem to be strongly related 
to voting in general and the timing of the vote decision in particular in the Netherlands. 
During the time of the pillarization, there was no cross-pressuring because there was a party 
for each important social group. When voting on ideological issues replaced this voting 
structured by social groups, there still was no important cross-pressuring. Even the 
introduction of a new cultural dimension has not led to postponement of vote decisions. To 
the extent that there is cross-pressure along two issue or ideological dimensions, Dutch 
voters seem able to resolve their dilemma just as quickly as other voters. 
  
4 Consideration or choice sets 
 
Yet, we still find that a large and increasing number of Dutch voters postpone their decision 
until the latest possible moment. Here, the ‘problem’ in the Netherlands may be an 
abundance of riches. There are a large number of parties from which to choose. In 2017, 
                                                          
8 This observation may lead to the question: ‘How long will it take until the PVV and the SP will 
merge into SPVV?’ (de Volkskrant, August 4, 2018). 
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there were 28 parties listed on at least one district ballot, and 13 received representation in 
Parliament (see e.g., Van Holsteyn, 2018). With so many belles at the ball, many of whom are 
more or less equally attractive, how do you choose with which one to dance? What do you 
do when you like a number of parties but are only allowed to cast a single vote? Does this 
affect the moment of making that decision? Schmitt-Beck and Partheymuller examined what 
they called ambivalence in the 2005 and 2009 German federal elections, and their 
conclusion is arguably related to this aspect: “Voters who hold several parties in similar 
esteem are particularly prone to arrive rather late at clear-cut choices” (Schmitt-Beck & 
Partheymuller, 2012: 306) Although they did not employ the term, what they are concerned 
with has come to be referred to as the concept of a consideration set or choice set. This 
concept may be highly relevant for the Dutch case (see e.g., Van Holsteyn & den Ridder, 
2008; Van der Meer et al., 2012; 2015; Tillie, 1995). 
 In the DPES, respondents are asked for ‘vote probability’ scores on a 10-point scale, 
running from 1 (never) to 10 (certainly sometime), indicating what the likelihood is that 
they will ever vote for a party. In 2017 this question was asked for thirteen parties. The first 
step in calculating the choice set is to determine to which party or parties the respondent 
has given the highest score. These parties and all parties receiving a score no more than two 
points lower than this highest probability score are included in the individual choice set.9 
For those who were able to rate at least one party, the scores run from 1 to 13.10  
Table 6 shows that those with larger numbers of parties in their consideration or 
choice set are more likely to delay the decision concerning which political party will finally 
get the vote - most likely one of the parties in their choice set (Van Holsteyn & den Ridder, 
2008: 44). Of those who made their decision months before the election, 36 per cent have 
only a single party in their choice set and an additional 30 per cent have two parties. The 
percentages with only a single party decreases as the election approaches, with only 13 per 
cent and 14 per cent of those deciding in the last days or on election day having only a single 
party in their choice set (to which can be added 20 and 22 per cent with two parties). In 
these two groups of late deciders, 25 per cent of those deciding in the last days and no fewer 
than 32 per cent of the election day deciders have five or more parties in their choice set. 
These results complement the results found for party attachment. It is not simply that late 
                                                          
9 This is, of course, a rather arbitrary cut-off point, but we consider parties that are so similar to each 
other on the 10-point scale ‘more or less equally attractive’. 
10 Among the latter, most of the responses indicated they would never vote for any of the parties, or 
gave a score of 5 indicating they were basically indifferent to all of the parties. 
For purposes of presentation, those with five or more parties in their choice set have been combined. 
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deciders lack a bond with or preference for a political party, they evaluate a large number of 
parties relatively equally. No wonder they delay their decision to the last minute.  
 
Table 6. Timing of the vote and number of parties in choice set, 2017 
Time of vote 
decision  
On 
Election 
day 
In the last  
days before 
election 
In the last 
weeks before 
the election 
A couple of 
months before 
the election 
More than a 
couple of months 
before the election 
Number of parties in choice set 
1 party 14 13 17 19 36 
2 parties 22 20 23 30 30 
3 parties 19 25 22 24 15 
4 parties 13 17 16 11 8 
5 or more 32 25 21 17 11 
Total 
N= 
100% 
193 
100% 
328 
99% 
263 
101% 
101 
100% 
431 
Average number 
of parties in 
choice set 
 
4.0 
 
3.7 
 
3.4 
 
3.0 
 
2.5 
   
    It is one thing to decrease the relevant supply of parties from almost thirty to less 
than five, but how to choose between this handful of alternatives that are basically equally 
preferable? One possible solution is to consult a Voting Advice Application (VAA), a device 
that was introduced in the Netherlands in 1994 and that has become very popular in many 
countries (see e.g., Garzia & Marshall, 2014).  The confused, or simply curious, voter can go 
online and fill in a questionnaire concerning his or her positions on a number of political 
issues. It may even be possible to indicate the relevance of issues, but the important part is 
the ‘advice’ that the program provides concerning the party or parties to which one is the 
closest. In 2017, almost three-fourths of the DPES respondents indicated that they had 
consulted a Voter Advice Application prior to the March 2017 general elections. 
 Although whether or not one consults a VAA is not related to the size of the choice 
set, there is a clear relationship with the timing of the vote (Table 7). Among those who 
made up their minds months before the election, about 60 per cent consulted a VAA. Among 
those voters who decided in the last days or on election day, and even for those who decided 
in the last weeks, at least 80 per cent of voters reported having consulted a VAA. 
 
Table 7. Timing of the vote and the use of a VAA, 2017 
Time of vote 
decision  
On 
Election 
day 
In the last  
days before 
election 
In the last 
weeks before 
the election 
A couple of 
months before 
the election 
More than a couple 
of months before 
the election 
Used a Voting Advice Application 
- Yes 86 83 80 72 59 
- No 14 17 20 28 41 
Total 
N= 
100% 
264 
100% 
556 
100% 
423 
100% 
148 
100% 
408 
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5 Late Deciders and the Election Result 
 
The claim that late deciders determine the election outcome is false: these votes count for no 
more or less than the votes of earlier deciders. However, it is possible that the outcome of an 
election diverges from what had been expected before or during the election campaign, in 
particular based on public opinion polls as the main source of expectations (e.g., Irwin & Van 
Holsteyn, 2002). To examine this, we first look at whether the supporters for various parties 
have made their determination at different points in time. Table 8a contains the timing of 
the vote decision for the thirteen parties included in the DPES and which received 
representation in the Second Chamber of Parliament. 
 
Table 8a. Party voters and their timing of the vote, 2017 
Time of 
vote 
decision  
On 
Election 
day 
In the last  
days before 
election 
In the last 
weeks before 
the election 
A couple of 
months 
before the 
election 
More than a 
couple of 
months 
Total/N 
Party choice 15 March 2017  
- SP 19 32 16 4 27 98%/200 
- GL 14 33 26 9 18 100%/251 
- PvdA 20 26 13 7 35 101%/128 
- D66 13 32 29 6 20 100%/325 
- CDA 12 33 24 6 25 100%/250 
- CU 14 15 19 14 38 100%/78 
- SGP 5 12 12 12 59 100%/41 
- VVD 12 23 22 10 32 99%/494 
- PVV 12 8 15 12 53 100%/315 
- PvdD 11 34 15 13 27 100%/88 
- 50PLUS 19 32 24 8 16 99%/82 
- DENK 8 45 20 20 8 101%/116 
- FvD 12 36 48 4 0 100%/50 
Note: 
- Among the voters for the SP, 19 per cent indicated that they had only reached a decision on election 
day, 32 per cent indicated that they had decided in the last days, 16 per cent in the last weeks of the 
campaign, 4 per cent a couple of months before the election, and 27 per cent even earlier. 
 
There are clear differences between the parties in the timing of vote decisions. Some 
parties have large percentages of voters who have determined their vote before the hot 
phase of the campaign. For instance, the State Reformed Party (SGP), which derives its 
electoral support from specific religious groups, has traditionally received a small but steady 
percentage of the vote (e.g., Van Holsteyn et al., 2018). This stability can be seen in the 70 
per cent of the SGP voters who knew how they would vote long before the campaign began. 
This is less the case for the other smaller religious party, the ChristianUnion (CU), but 
nevertheless a majority (52%) of CU voters knew in advance. The third party for which a 
majority of voters knew well in advance was the PVV; about two-thirds of those voters who 
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cast their vote for this party, said that they knew before the start of the campaign that they 
would support team-Wilders. No other party can count on such solid or at least early 
support of voters; all ten other parties were locked in a fierce competition for votes up until 
the election day itself.11  
Although late deciders do not influence the outcome of an election more than early 
deciders, they certainly influence our perception of the outcome. In the months before the 
March 2017 parliamentary election and as early as October 2016, the polls consistently 
showed the PVV as the largest party, ahead of the VVD. The gap between the two grew in 
November and December 2016, with at the peak showing 36 seats for the PVV and 23 seats 
for the Liberals. This gap began to narrow at the beginning of 2017, with the parties running 
neck-and-neck in February and early March up until about a week before the election. The 
final results showed that the VVD had gained 21 per cent of the vote (33 seats), against 13 
per cent (20 seats) for the PVV and a rather disappointed Geert Wilders. 
 It was shown that the PVV had the second largest percentage of early deciders. This 
knowledge helps explain the trends in the polls, and the ‘surprising’ election result. Table 8b 
(second column) examines what the results of the election would have been if the late 
deciders had not voted, combining all those voters who had determined their vote decision 
before the last days of the campaign. Although these results show the VVD with the larger 
percentage, the difference is only 5 per cent; if we look at the earliest deciders, the PVV 
scores 24 per cent, against 23 per cent for the VVD. However, the PVV did poorly among the 
late deciders, receiving 6 per cent of their vote. When combined, its total percentage drops 
to 13 per cent. The VVD ‘lost’ a smaller percentage of the vote, but ended up with 20 per 
cent, 7 per cent more than the PVV. Had one drawn conclusions on the basis of public 
opinion polls held several weeks or months before the March 15 election, one would have 
been surprised by the results -  late deciders had determined the outcome! 
 Above it was shown that a larger percentage of votes in the Labour Heartland made 
their decision during the last phase of the campaign. Looking at the parties on the left (PvdA, 
SP, GreenLeft, and D66), one surprising result was the lack of support for the PvdA. Whereas 
this party once commanded a majority of the votes in its heartland, it now was competing 
for votes with these other parties - and came out on the losing end. There was no return to 
the party at the last moment, as it received only one per cent more of the vote on election 
day as it had among the group that had decided months ahead. Party leader Lodewijk 
Asscher only made a strong impression during the televised election debate on election 
                                                          
11 The low percentage for the Forum for Democracy (FvD) is at least partly due to the fact that this 
was a new party at this election, so voters could hardly have made a determination at an early date. 
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night, but this obviously was “too little, too late to help his party at the election the following 
day” (Van Holsteyn, 2018: 4).  The other three parties made gains with the help of the late 
deciders, all ending up with slightly higher total percentages.  
 
Table 8b. Vote choice among early and late deciders, 2017 
 Last days 
before election 
Weeks or months 
before election 
 
Total 
Actual 
Election result 
VVD 18 22 20 21 
PVV 6 17 13 13 
CDA 11 10 10 12 
D66 15 12 13 12 
GreenLeft 12 9 10 9 
SP 11 7 8 9 
PvdA 6 5 5 6 
CU 2 4 3 3 
PvdD 4 3 4 3 
50PLUS 3 2 3 3 
SGP 1 2 2 2 
DENK 6 4 5 2 
FvD 2 2 2 2 
Other parties 2 1 1 2 
Total 99% 100% 99% 99% 
N 985 1442 2427 10,516,041 
Note: 
- Partly due to weighing on the election outcome, the DPES election result is very similar to the actual 
election result. 
 
 New political parties or party lists also made gains in the last days of the campaign. 
The ethnic party DENK, the party for the elderly 50PLUS, and the new Forum for Democracy 
(FvD) all picked up votes. The numbers are small, but this could have been just what was 
needed to gain an extra parliamentary seat in the extreme proportional Dutch system. 
Finally, the parties who did not get representation in Parliament, also picked up votes at the 
very last minute.  It is probably not too farfetched to suggest that voters who had few 
positive feelings about parties, ended up casting a ‘wasted vote’ for one of the 15 parties on 
the ballot who did not exceed the electoral threshold.  
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
The seminal election studies, and many thereafter, have left a predominantly negative 
impression of those citizens who wait until the last minute to determine their party choice 
at an election. Such voters are said to be of lower education, less interested, and less 
politically informed. They have been said to make their choices at random. At the obverse, 
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those who know their decision well in advance are better educated, more interested, and 
better informed. 
 These early studies were carried out in the United States and at an earlier time - the 
1940s and 1950s. Since that time, much has changed. Across democratic systems, there has 
been a decline in levels of party identification and other structural factors impacting on 
electoral behavior. Electoral volatility has increased. Election campaigns and the media have 
changed. And as a result of such developments, there has been a substantial rise in the 
numbers of late deciders, which has been documented across a number of political systems. 
Such changes are reason to re-examine and profile late deciders again, in this case in the 
context of the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election. 
 In the Dutch case, women were found to be somewhat overrepresented among the 
late deciders. A stronger relationship is found for age, with younger voters more prevalent 
among the late deciders; this is likely an artefact of the fact that younger voters are less 
likely to have a strong identification with or attachment to a party. In contradiction to many 
other studies, only a very weak relationship was found with the level of education. 
 With basically no relationship with education, the question arises whether late 
deciders are less interested and less informed. The answer of course depends on what is 
defined as interest and information. Late deciders indeed show lower levels of a general 
interest in politics and attention to the media in order to obtain information. However, when 
interest and information is focused on the election campaign, the relationships are weak. 
Late deciders are only minimally less likely to read about the campaign in newspapers, 
follow the campaign on the television news, watch televised debates among party leaders, or 
indicate that they followed the campaign. Only small differences were found between late 
and early decides in their attention to public opinion polls. 
 An early explanation of late deciding was that voters were cross-pressured, either 
because of conflicting social background characteristics or conflicting attitudes. This was 
examined by looking at late deciding along the ideological issue dimensions of the Dutch 
system. It was noted that cross-pressuring could hardly exist in the Netherlands where 
political parties existed for the combinations of the social-economic issue dimension and the 
religious-secular dimension. What did emerge was the late deciders were less likely to have 
strong opinions on these dimensions: they had not been cross-pressured, but had 
inconclusive attitudes. In recent decades a new cultural dimension has emerged in Dutch 
politics which might have led to cross-pressuring. Yet, here again, those who were 
potentially cross-pressured were not overrepresented among the late deciders.  
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 No stronger relationship is found in the study of late deciders than that such voters 
lack a strong attachment to a political party. These results were again found among Dutch 
voters. However, in the multi-party system of the Netherlands, such a conclusion does not 
provide a complete picture; the concept of party identification has been called into question 
in the Netherlands. This can also be seen when one examines the concept of consideration or 
choice sets, i.e., the parties for which a voter might at some point cast a vote. Relatively few 
Dutch voters have only a single party in their consideration set. Yet only 38 per cent of those 
voters who are defined as identifiers using the standard operationalization have only a 
single party in their consideration set. Even these voters indicate that they might vote for 
another party in a future election. On the other hand, among those who are defined as non-
identifiers, 14 per cent have only a single party and no fewer than 37 per cent have five or 
more parties in their consideration set.  
 Late deciders tend to have greater numbers in their consideration set than early 
deciders. This would seem to explain the lack of relationship found between indicators of 
interest in and attention to the campaign. Whereas early deciders may have only a single 
party in consideration, late deciders have to choose from a larger number. Making this 
choice involves paying attention to the campaign. Something has to be found to break the tie 
among parties for whom one has equal or almost equal attachment. There are many belles at 
the Dutch ball, but the voter is only allowed to dance with a single partner. 
 McAllister studied voters in Australia, Britain and the United States and classified 
late deciders in two distinct groups. On the one hand, there were the uninterested and 
uninformed late deciders (of the seminal studies…): the ‘capricious’ voters. On the other 
hand, he found late deciders who were ‘calculating’. He found that the latter were more 
numerous in all three countries, and that their numbers were increasing (McAllister, 2002). 
No attempt has been made here to classify late deciders in such terms. However, it is 
plausible that our results would be similar. Undoubtedly there are late deciders who are 
uninterested and uninformed, but their numbers are very likely not such that they dominate 
the group of late deciders, which would result in overrepresentation in the late decider 
group. One should not forget that there are also those who are uninterested and uninformed 
among early deciders - if you know far in advance for which party you will vote, there is no 
need to follow the campaign in detail. On the other hand, there are calculating late deciders 
who must follow the campaign in order to make a final decision concerning to which party 
to give their vote.  
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 In conclusion, the negative description of late deciders must be abandoned. 
Rehabilitation of the late deciding voter is in order. Late deciders are just what the term 
implies. They are voters of whom many need and use politically relevant and campaign 
information until the last minute before making their final determination. If anything, this is 
a positive, rather than negative, characteristic. 
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